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‘Today, one can hear almost any style of music in any sur­
rounding and in any situation. The sound of big opera ensembles can be 
fitted onto a windsurfing board, and the sound of a nylon-stringed guitar 
can fill a football stadium; one can listen to march music in the bathtub 
and salon music in the mountains’,1 writes Ola Stockfelt.
Advances in technology have made possible not only the omnipres­
ence of music in our environment, but also the emergence of new musical 
genres, making increasing use of electroacoustic media. According to 
Denis Smalley, this ‘revolution in the sounding content of musical works’ 
has also brought about a considerable expansion of the variety of listen­
ing responses.2 The fact that music reaches us in contemporary culture in 
so many different circumstances and in such different varieties is condu­
cive to profound and wide-ranging reflection on the subject of listening. 
This encompasses such problems as the listener’s activeness and atti­
tude, which, as Smalley states, oscillates, in most general terms, between 
passive and uncontrolled ‘hearing’ and the conscious, intentional ‘act of 
listening’.3 Each of these attitudes may be adopted in a range of circum­
stances, in respect to both the musical work and the sounds that sur­
round us. If we tend to associate listening rather more with music than 
with the sonic environment, then this is because we are influenced by
1 Ola Stockfelt, ‘Adequate Modes of Listening’, in Audio Culture: Readings in Mod­
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Era’, in Companion to Contemporary Musical Thought, ed. John Paynter, Tim Ho­
well, Richard Orton and Peter Seymour, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1992), 514. 
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specific conventions. From the sociological-historical point of view, claims 
Stockfelt, we can speak of numerous, equally valid, ‘adequate modes of 
listening’, since a range of receptive situations that are typical of a given 
musical genre shape the ideal of the listener’s attitude and the optimal 
relationship between listener and music.4 Over recent years, the intense 
development of psychoacoustic research has given rise to another re­
search perspective, one that allows us to verify many convictions regard­
ing the boundaries and specific nature of auditory perception.
In the context of the changes occurring in the way we listen, ques­
tions are increasingly being asked about the contribution of music theory 
to auditory experience and the value of so-called analytical listening. In 
his book Music, Imagination and Culture, Nicholas Cook aims to show 
the divergence between the analytical listening postulated by music 
theorists and listening for pleasure, without engaging one’s knowledge of 
musical structure. The former, active way of listening, which Cook calls 
‘musicological’,5 has been recommended by Eduard Hanslick, Theodor 
W. Adorno and Carl Dahlhaus, among others. A number of psychoacoustic 
studies have shown that in practice this proves to be an ideal that is hard 
to realise. Even musically trained persons are unable to grasp the hierar­
chic structures of classical musical forms while listening, do not notice 
slight changes to the tonal scheme of a sonata, and cannot follow all the 
passages of the theme of a fugue.6 Thus the limits of perception turn out 
to be considerably narrower than some theorists might have thought. 
Writing about ‘musicological listening’, Cook does not refer to any specific 
theory of analysis, mentioning only typical skills acquired during a musi­
cal education. The procedures performed during experiments concern 
such things as key recognition and ordering the elements of forms.
Besides the model of ‘musicological’ listening and its opposite, the 
complete ignoring of music, degrading it to the level of noise, Cook, refer­
ring to such authorities as John Blacking and Virgil Thomson, also dis­
tinguishes ‘musical listening’,7 typical not only of the amateur, but also of 
professional musicians who, albeit for just a moment, have forgotten 
about their profession in favour of unconstrained, spontaneous experi­
ences. ‘Musical listening’ requires neither effort, close attention nor intel­
lectual input. In this sense it remains passive, as ‘just listening’,8 involv­
ing solely our physiological and emotional responses, in moments of
4 Ola Stockfelt, ‘Adequate Modes’, 91.
5 See Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination and Culture (Oxford, 1992), 152.
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7 Ibid., 152.
8 Ibid., 160.
forgetting. The immediacy of this way of experiencing music is contrasted 
with the aesthetic distance of ‘musicological listening’.
In closing his considerations, Cook stresses that the divergence be­
tween ‘musical listening’ and ‘musicological listening’ should not arouse 
disquiet or force the rejection of one in favour of the other. Both types of re­
ception are important elements of Western European musical culture and 
show to what extent perceptual facts may depart from aesthetic ideals.
‘A formal model of music’, Cook concludes, ‘should be valued in the 
same way as any other metaphorical construction: for its usefulness, for 
its heuristic value, and perhaps for the intellectual satisfaction that it af­
fords, but not for its truth’.9
‘If what he says is true, music theory is in deep trouble’.10 Thus wrote 
David Huron in his review of Cook. In fact, despite his preference for em­
pirical research, Huron posits that what Cook writes is not true. Huron 
has a somewhat different idea of the significance of music theory and 
music analysis, far from deeming them merely cultural fictions or meta­
phors. Questioning the simplistic division into ‘scientific’ and ‘culture- 
orientated’, he defends the possible contribution of both disciplines to 
musical culture, through their influence on composers, listeners and per­
formers, and also to the scientific study of music, even if this were to 
prove to be the study of human imagination. Günter Kreutz states, 
meanwhile, that the experiments relating to the perception of musical 
form carried out thus far provide insufficient grounds for drawing un­
equivocal conclusions.11 At the same time, he postulates a greater inter­
action between psychoacoustic research and music theory, asserting that 
this will make it easier to avoid the ‘speculative symbolism’ of musical 
analysis.
The idea of the metaphoric character of the theories underpinning 
analytical listening is shared by other scholars, although not always in 
such radically-formulated terms. Cook bases his conviction that the for­
mal models of music are metaphoric constructs on the views of Roger 
Scruton, who has stated that ‘there lies, in our most basic apprehension 
of music, a complex system of metaphor, which is the true description of 
no material fact’.12 The key to understanding this and other utterances of 
Scruton’s is the phenomenon of ‘aspect perception’, described by Ludwig
9 Ibid., 235-236.
10 David Huron, ‘ “Music, Imagination, and Culture”, by Nicholas Cook’, Music 
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Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations.13 ‘Seeing’ as such is beyond our 
control, yet we can decide what we wish to capture in a given look. As a re­
sult, we may experience ‘double intentionality’, relating to two different ob­
jects at the same time. As we read in Philosophical Investigations, ‘I con­
template a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that 
it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing 
an aspect”.’14 Wittgenstein also writes that, ‘The flashing of an aspect on us 
seems half visual experience, half thought’.15 ‘Seeing as’ is half act (choice), 
half experience, linked to the appearance of a picture in one’s imagination.
The skill of aspect perception does not concern seeing alone, but re­
lates to the apprehension of reality on various planes. Marcus B. Hester 
applied this notion to poetry, stating that the figurativeness typical of 
metaphor is guided by the experience of ‘aspect seeing’.16 Metaphor, as 
Paul Ricoeur later wrote, ‘joins the light of sense with the fullness of the 
image’.17 In Scruton’s aesthetic, seeing is replaced by hearing, as the 
main question that he sets himself is how it comes about that we hear 
sounds as music. Scruton suggests that the listener has no choice but to 
hear sounds as music and that the experience of its reception is condi­
tioned by the most basic metaphors, such as musical space and motion. 
These play a similar role to that of the pure forms of sensible intuition 
(time and space) in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. ‘If the metaphors 
are dispensable, it is only for the trivial reason that our world might not 
have contained the experience of music. But this too could be doubted: for 
perhaps it is the nature of reason, to hear sounds in just this way?’18
Although Scruton himself does not relate his ideas to music analysis, 
critics and continuators of his theory do. ‘Given that its aim is to per­
suade the reader to perceive in a certain way, not simply to think about 
the music in abstraction’, writes Naomi Cumming, ‘the analytic notation 
does represent a “perceptually embodied thought” and not simply a con­
ceptualisation. “Imaginative perception” and “belief’ are compatible with 
one another in music analysis, since both are involved in constructing 
a representation of music as an intentional object.’19 Stockfelt, too, opines
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Gertrude E. M. Ans- 
combe (Oxford, 1958), 193-214.
14 Ibid., 193.
15 Ibid., 195.
16 Marcus B. Hester, The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor (Hague, 1967).
17 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaugh­
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that all disputes between theorists can be treated as argumentation in 
favour of various modes of listening. Thus there is no single ideal of 
autonomous listening, only numerous varieties thereof.20 The advantage 
of this approach is that the multiplicity and rivalry of the perspectives 
proposed by the various analytical theories conveys that voluntary char­
acter of imagination-dependent experiences to a much greater extent 
than indispensable metaphors of motion and space. Imagination enables 
the free flow of unasserted thoughts.21 Mark DeBellis refers to this very 
capacity when he writes that the verification of theories does not play 
a decisive role in auditory experience. From the receiver’s point of view, the 
elasticity of this experience proves more crucial: ‘A concern with confir­
mation and disconfirmation -  arguably central to science -  does not play 
a comparably important role vis-a-vis the listening situation [...] The fal­
sity of a theoretical assumption that plays a causal role in someone’s ar­
riving at a certain aesthetic situation will not undermine the situation. 
For the listener, such assumptions are a ladder one might kick away’.22 
The ‘ladder’ of analytical premises enables a kind of experience which in 
another case would be unattainable, and in the opinion of some scholars 
it is the aesthetic situation that may serve as the ultimate validation of 
analysis. ‘An assertion is justified by its enriching effect on hearing -  on its 
codifying or changing it’,23 writes Marion Guck. This applies in particular 
to ‘incorrigible personal statements’, present even in the most formalised 
theories of analysis. While they are not subject to verification, they do in­
duce us to imagine a situation in which the listener senses the same thing 
as the person expressing his personal relationship with music.24
Attempts by musicologists to investigate analytical imagination are 
increasingly frequent, especially in connection with the reception of the 
cognitive theory of metaphor. In many cases, they concern those theories 
of analysis which have gained considerable popularity and become an 
undisputed source of musicological terms. It might be said that the
20 Ola Stockfelt, ‘Adequate Modes’, 92.
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23 Marion Guck, ‘Rehabilitating the Incorrigible’, in Theory, Analysis and Mean­
ing in Music, 63.
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greater the freedom of imagination they are able to display, and thus the 
greater the contrast that emerges between the different modes of listen­
ing, and the more similar the material under analysis, the greater is the 
appeal of the cited examples.
Michael Spitzer has tried to juxtapose listening according to the theo­
ries of Heinrich Schenker and Leonard B. Meyer,25 taking as his example 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Piano Sonata in G major, KV 283. The first 
analysis26 focuses on the continuity of the work and the voice leading, the 
second on segmentation. Music as motion or as a living organism are 
metaphors typical of Schenker. Meyer, meanwhile, prefers the metaphor 
of music as language, with a corresponding vocabulary and grammar. In 
both cases, an important role is also played by the philosophical back­
ground: Hegelian for Schenker, whilst Meyer betrays the influence of the 
pragmatists (John Dewey, Herbert Mead) and of Gestalt psychology.
In comparing the ‘analytical fictions’27 of three prominent theorists -  
Edward T. Cone, Allen Forte and Carl Schachter -  Guck juxtaposed the 
analyses of works from a similar period and from the same aesthetic cir­
cle. Cone’s analysis of Franz Schubert’s Moment musical in A flat major 
resembles the description of an inner psychological drama, as is attested 
by such terms as ‘anxiety’ or ‘promise’. Analysing Johannes Brahms’s 
Second Symphony, Schachter, making use of vocabulary typical of 
Schenkerian analysis, emphasises the role of tension, motion and change. 
Both authors make greater use of verbs than nouns, which reflects the 
dynamic character of the music. In contrast to them, Forte reifies the 
musical construct (Brahms’s Alto Rhapsody). He analyses it from the po­
sition of an observer, who does not enter into contact with the work but 
describes its construction and enumerates its physical attributes. Emo­
tional involvement is contrasted with attempts at objectivisation.
In all the cited analyses, metaphor highlights and integrates various 
areas of experience -  emotions, corporeal experience, abstract thinking. 
‘If perceived musical structure is indivisible from physical and emotional 
response, then metaphors may offer an embryonic structural interpreta­
tion reinforced by -  explained through -  physical-emotional responses’,28 
writes Guck. The instructive, multi-dimensional character of this figure 
proves particularly valuable when the listener himself seeks adequate 
ways of speaking about music. Hence the important role played by meta­
25 See Michael Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical Thought (Chicago, 2004), 28-44.
26 The author uses to this end a graph produced by Felix Salzer, a populariser of 
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27 Marion Guck, ‘Analytical Fictions’, Music Theory Spectrum 16/2 (1994).
28 Marion Guck, ‘Musical Images as Musical Thoughts: The Contribution of Me­
taphor to Analysis’, In Theory Only 5/5 (1981), 42.
phoric imagination in music teaching, as well. The thesis formulated by 
Guck is illustrated by the metaphor of a musical ‘arch’, which is the effect 
of research carried out on students and alumni of music departments. 
The participants’ task was to listen to Fryderyk Chopin’s Prelude in 
B minor without the music, to describe it intuitively, and then to compare 
their descriptions with the score. The multi-dimensional metaphor of the 
‘arch’ is not confined to the outward profile of the course of the melody in 
a rising and falling direction, but even concerns individual motoric asso­
ciations, the inner recollection of motion, the sequence of emotions and 
the flow of the narrative. As a result, it extends its scope to cover other 
parameters of the work -  dynamics, rhythm, overall scheme -  each of 
which may gain or lose in intensity.29
The mutual connection between music and motion reveals its signifi­
cance also in the case of performers, who through specific motoric exer­
cises, aiding the dynamic representation of tonal space, stimulate their 
sensitivity to music. In this way they learn to understand it more fully, 
as well as improving their performance skills. An original solution in this 
domain was put forward by Alexandra Pierce, who sought equivalents to 
Schenker’s structural theories in the differentiated level of motoric activ­
ity in different areas of the performer’s body.30
Metaphorical descriptions of musical structures fulfil numerous 
communicational functions. They can enrich the auditory experiences of 
those who come into contact with them, and they enable their authors to 
express the multi-dimensionality of this experience. The role of metaphor 
is not restricted to the verbal level. According to a thesis so often stressed 
in contemporary theories of metaphor, this figure not only allows ab­
stract things to be described by means of concrete expressions acting on 
our imagination, but it also helps us to think about them in such terms. 
It mediates between various spheres, and thereby facilitates the com­
plete reception of music, connecting notions with specific images and 
emotions. Consequently, as Hannah Arendt writes, metaphor ‘may be 
seen as a kind of “proof’ that mind and body, thinking and sense experi­
ence, the invisible and the visible, belong to one another, are “made” for 
each other, as it were’.31
Translated by John Comber
29 See Marion Guck, ‘Two Types of Metaphoric Transference’, in Music and Mean­
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